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Abstract
ASEAN's development, though gradual and slow, has consistently demon-
strated an uphill shift from a focus on regional peace and stability to closer 
economic integration. Amid economic difficulties, ASEAN took on the task of 
setting goals for the region as clearly laid out by Vision 2020. The vision for 
the future goes beyond the two-page Bangkok Declaration set in 1967. The 
ultimate goal is to achieve an integrated ASEAN community with a common 
regional identity. Considering the downturns and problems that are affecting 
the organization, scholars have argued that successful integration is highly 
unlikely for ASEAN. The route is laden with obstacles that urgently need to 
be cleared. Based on this understanding, the paper first reviews the analysis 
of the determinants of the success and failure of regional integration. It then 
attempts to show that there lies a deeper root cause of concern, one that has 
been fundamentally imbedded and has come to dictate the working traditions 
of ASEAN. Proper reconfiguration and supplementation of the ASEAN process 
is a key necessity to reviving ASEAN's dynamism and competitiveness and as 
such should not be sidelined any longer.* 
Introduction
Regional institutions are constantly challenged by the changing times 
that are an integral facet of an anarchic international system. In times 
of change, adaptation and adjustment are important to maintain their 
significance and reliability. Some organizations weathered the test of 
time while some faltered and withered away into the background of 
global politics. Throughout history, there have been numerous regional 
groupings with differing goals but mostly centred around political and 
economic objectives. Of the many regional integration plans or initiatives 
that have surfaced over time in various parts of the world, only a hand-
ful have materialized into well-established institutions, the two most 
successful being the European Union (EU) and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) is a good example of a regional integration scheme.
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ASEAN's creation was initially for security. It was neither formed to 
integrate member economies nor to build a supranational institution. 
While it is an undisputed fact that ASEAN and the EU have very dif-
ferent orientations, both were originally created for the preservation of 
peace and security in their respective regions. The Europeans realized 
that a new European institution was needed to constrain Germany. 
Similarly, ASEAN was formed to constrain Indonesia. As Konfrontasi 
(confrontation) was a clear indication of Indonesia's powerful military 
might that stands to destabilize the region, the establishment of ASEAN 
was a direct response to the intra-regional stimulus of Sukarno's Konfron-
tasi. Drawing a somewhat analogous line to the downfall of Germany's 
Hitler, ASEAN became viable and visible only after a change in Indone-
sia's leadership had occurred. While the European community moved 
closer towards economic integration through the Treaty of Rome (1957), 
ASEAN has, to some degree, strengthened its foundation in security 
cooperation; first, with the 1971 declaration of a Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and second, during the 1976 Bali Conference 
that produced the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
(TAC). Economic cooperation was minimal. ASEAN members' economic 
attainments were the makings of individual policies and their dealings 
with the broader international economy and had very little to do with 
ASEAN as an organization (Charterjee 1990). This explains why there 
have been rather limited complimentary economic policies due to low 
intra-ASEAN trade. 
While ASEAN was focusing more on security issues throughout the 
Cold War period, movements toward economic integration became 
more visible in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, 1992 was seen as the 
year that 'launched' the economic integration of ASEAN. A series of 
economic-related proposals and adoptions have been made since then. 
Those include the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme 
for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, the Framework Agree-
ment on Services and agreement on Intellectual Property in 1995, the 
Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 1996, ASEAN Investment 
Area agreement and the Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of 
Goods in Transit in 1998, the e-ASEAN framework in 2000 and to a 
certain extent the ASEAN Tourism agreement in 2002. Many of these 
are legally binding documents that probably show ASEAN's growing 
realization for the need to have legal binding foundations if integration 
is to succeed. According to Takeuchi, there are four factors contribut-
ing to ASEAN's increased interest in regional economic integration: the 
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need to balance China's, as well as the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe's, competition for foreign investment; the fear of future exports 
being affected by the formation of NAFTA and the closely integrated 
EU; the perceived convergence of regional economic relationships 
among member states; and the necessity 'to keep regional liberaliza-
tion one step ahead of the WTO and APEC at all times' (Takeuchi 1999: 
123-24). Apart from the four, the 1997 Asian financial crisis is surely a 
contributing factor to faster and closer economic cooperation in order to 
build regional resilience against external volatilities. The 1977 ASEAN 
currency swap arrangement, for example, was resuscitated and extended 
under the 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Furthermore, it was during 
the onslaught of the Asian meltdown that ASEAN members reaffirmed 
their commitment for regional solidarity, producing the ASEAN Vision 
2020 statement. This is a step higher than the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, 
with 'closer cohesion and economic integration' clearly spelled out, as 
compared to the thirty year old ambiguous two-page declaration. As 
a result, ASEAN as a regional organization has gradually shifted from 
merely a loose security arrangement to one that is working towards being 
a fully integrated community. Under this notion, it is possible to gauge if 
an ASEAN community bound by a common regional identity as stated 
in Vision 2020 could be achieved or not, based on an analytical framework 
of the determinants of the success and failure of regional integration.1
In reviewing the analytical framework, this paper attempts to show 
that there lies a deeper root cause of concern, one that points to the work-
ing traditions and diplomatic culture of ASEAN. Thus the objectives 
of this paper are two-fold. Firstly, it will be argued that the prospect of 
attaining the 'stated integration goal' as envisioned by Vision 2020 is 
strongly related to the concept of the ASEAN way or the ASEAN proc-
ess. By emphasizing consultation and consensus, this concept serves as 
the bedrock of how ASEAN functions as an organization, internally and 
externally as well as politically, economically and socially. 
By tying it to the first, my second argument is that this process, being 
the most important centripetal force, is not capable of leading ASEAN 
towards a successful regionally integrated institution in this global new 
age even though ASEAN has achieved some past successes from it. 
Hence, for integration to succeed the conceptualization of the norms of 
procedure need to be rethought and some degree of sovereignty has to 
be negotiated.  This paper is organized into two sections. The first part 
examines and identifies a common denominator based on the defined 
analytical framework of ASEAN as a regional integration scheme and 
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the second part looks into key areas that require reformulation and 
change by ASEAN to pursue its integration quest. Here, it should be 
made clear that the reasoning of the success and failure of regional 
integration should not be confused with the reasoning of the attempts 
at regional integration. 
Defining the ASEAN Diplomacy
The 'ASEAN way' or the 'ASEAN process' is understood to have been 
posited under the theory of constructivism, which was seen as an at-
tempt to respond to the realist approach regarding factors determining 
state interactions in Southeast Asia. Constructivist scholars conceive 
that through a shared collective identity, ASEAN has built a set of 
norms defining states' behaviour that each member state is required 
to adhere to.2 In a broader perspective, these ASEAN values or norms 
are 'the hybrid offspring of an Asian value system' and the develop-
ment of ASEAN 'has been guided in part by the underlying beliefs and 
principles of Asian values' (Noor 1999: 166). Unfortunately, they do not 
reflect the value system of ASEAN peoples as a whole. Arguing that 
'the development of a non-elite and more popular sense of common 
ASEAN identity' may be hindered, Noor stated that 'the ascendancy of 
an elite discourse based upon a common elite political culture and value 
framework [of the traditional ruling elite] may well retard the progress 
and development of an ASEAN organization that is dedicated to the 
interests of ASEAN citizens themselves' (Noor 1999: 166). Indeed, the 
ASEAN way, if any, provides a sense of regional identity only at the 
intergovernmental level. A people's ASEAN has yet to be realized. As 
echoed by a former Thai Foreign Minister, the future of ASEAN should 
become 'an ASEAN of the people, [and] not just an ASEAN of govern-
ment leaders' (Pitsuwan 2001: 8).
As the ASEAN way is an evolving interactive process, it is not easily 
defined. Haacke noted that there are at least three distinct conceptualiza-
tions of the ASEAN way. First, it is 'an intramural approach to dispute 
management and confidence building'. Second, it is a decision-making 
method associated with the principles of musjawarah (consultation) and 
mufakat (consensus) that is originally a native political process built 
on ancient Javanese customs which basically express ways of resolv-
ing political and personal differences through lengthy consideration 
concluding in unanimous decision. The third refers to Acharya's con-
ceptualization that is a 'process of identity building which relies upon 
conventional modern principles of interstate relations as well as tradi-
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tional and culture-specific modes of socialization and decision-making' 
(Haacke 2003: 58-59; Acharya 2001: 28).3 For the purpose of this article, 
the ASEAN way denotes a broad definition that covers both the basic 
international norms and the socio-cultural norms steering interaction 
among the ten Southeast Asian members. Key features would mainly 
include respect for sovereignty, non-interference, non-use of force, quiet 
diplomacy (which may include informality and saving face), non-in-
volvement of the organization in bilateral disputes and mutual respect 
(for the sensitivity of others), frequent consultations, consensus-building, 
accommodation, discretion and conciliation.
The Requirements for Successful Regional Integration
What exactly constitutes a successful regional institution? As mentioned 
earlier, why do only a few regional organizations succeed among the 
many? Walter Mattli points out that the success of a voluntary regional 
integration plan depends critically on the demand and supply condi-
tion. An area with a significant cross-border exchange of trade will 
lead to strong market pressure for integration, which Mattli labels as 
a demand condition. Conversely, the integration process will come to 
a halt if the potentiality for gain is very low due to certain factors like 
the lack of complementarity among regional economies or the absence 
of vital economies of scale. Success, according to him, is defined as the 
realization of 'stated integration goals'. 
As for the supply condition, each plan or scheme must have the pres-
ence of a munificent leader/country that will act as a central figure in 
the coordination of rules, regulations, and policies and assist in easing 
tensions that may 'arise from the inequitable distribution of gains from 
integration' (Mattli 1999: 42). Those two conditions above are consid-
ered by Mattli to be of primary importance. A third less-crucial condi-
tion would be the creation of 'commitment institutions' as third party 
enforcers in helping to catalyze the integration process by improving 
'compliance with the rules of cooperation' and preventing reneging 
(Mattli 1999: 42-43).
Another key point put forward is the notion that political leaders who 
face economic difficulties at home will promote regional integration if they 
are convinced that their political survival depends on it. Two current in-
tegration schemes that satisfy Mattli's primary conditions are the EU and 
NAFTA, led by Germany and the United States respectively. In the case of 
the EU, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice are 
seen as examples of 'commitment institutions' fostering integration.
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Mattli's explanatory framework is not without limitations. Douglas 
Webber briefly provided six objections or reservations, questioning Mat-
tli's conditions of successful integration. He notes that: firstly, policies to 
integrate markets in creating a free trade area or common market should 
not be the only focus as there can also be emphasis on the 'integration 
or coordination of other kinds of policies' in some regional integration 
schemes, although it stopped short of explaining what are those kinds of 
policies and how they are related to the success and failure of integration; 
secondly, there should be an explanation of interregional variations of 
'stated integration goals' such as why the EU's integration agenda seems 
to be more thorough and far-reaching than NAFTA's; thirdly, 'a coali-
tion of leading states' apart from a hegemonic state do stand a chance 
to provide the obligatory leadership for successful integration citing 
the close bilateral relationship of France and Germany as a more real-
istic interpretation of EU's success; fourthly, 'commitment institutions' 
should not be seen as only a pre-condition but they can also emerge as 
the consequences of successful integration; fifthly, economic difficul-
ties as a condition may not necessarily encourage regional cooperation 
and even if it does, it may help to explain the attempt at, rather than 
the success/failure of regional integration; and lastly, the stipulation 
of leadership role is not only determined by hard variables (economic 
size, population, and military strength) but may also be dependent on 
soft variables (foreign policy strategies, history, and collective memo-
ries) (Webber 2001: 344-45). While accepting Mattli's first two 'strong' 
conditions and rejecting the others, Webber put forth another two of 
his own – the 'degree of economic and political homogeneity' – and the 
role of the United States (US) in influencing regional integration projects 
(Webber 2001: 347).
Identifying the Impeding Factor
 Based on the conditions as spelled out in the previous section, both 
Mattli and Webber took to the task of analyzing ASEAN as a regional 
integration scheme/project. The results of their individual analysis 
were daunting. As shown in Table 1, Mattli provided three reasons 
and Webber four as to why ASEAN would not succeed in its 'stated 
integration goals'.
Both Mattli and Webber agreed on the first two reasons (see Table 1). 
The first reason of 'low and non-complementary intra-regional trade' 
cannot be simply understood in economic terms but should be put in a 
historical context. ASEAN as an organization was borne out of regional 
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conflict whereby the founding leaders had no agenda of integrating 
member economies even though that notion was not alien to them as 
they were much aware of what was transpiring in Western Europe. 
Moreover, Southeast Asian countries' economic successes, especially 
among the ASEAN-five, prior to the economic crisis, were achieved 
through individual efforts under the directives of each nation's own 
national economic policies. Most of them share the same markets and 
compete in the same industrial sectors. As history has shown, the bulk 
of early cooperation among member-states was in the areas of security, 
first with the communist insurgencies, followed by superpower rivalries 
and the invasion in neighbouring Indochina (Vietnam-Cambodia issue). 
Serious economic cooperation only took off after the Cold War ended, 
mostly attributed to the trepidation of NAFTA's and the EU's integration 
plans. Also, this is related to the unsuccessful attempt of an East Asian 
Economic Group/Caucus (EAEG/EAEC) proposed by Malaysian Prime 
Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, in 1990. Had the EAEG proposal gone 
through, AFTA might not have come about or may have been realized 
in a different form.4 While economic integration has been somewhat 
expedited since then, more so after the economic crisis, intra trade has 
generally remained low. In 1993, trade among the ten Southeast Asian 
countries stood at around 22 percent of total exports and in 2002 it was 
only at 24 percent (WTO Trade Statistics 2003).
There are two possible reasons to this. First, ASEAN is incapable of 
drawing up any kind of treaty like the 1957 Treaty of Rome establish-
ing the European Economic Community. A treaty with clear rules and 
procedures would have arguably bound and ensured commitment from 
TABLE 1:  Reasons Why ASEAN is not a Successful Regional Institution
Pre-Conditions Mattli Webber
Strong market pressure Low and non-complementary intra-regional trade
Undisputed leadership Lack an undisputed leader
'Commitment institutions' No central monitor-
ing or third-party 
enforcement
-
Economic & political
homogeneity -
High level of disparities 
in economic development 
and openness.
The US factor - 'Benign indifference'
Sources:  Adapted from Mattli (1999: 169-71) and Webber (2001: 351-53).
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member-states. This inability is tied to a political culture, which holds 
sovereignty and non-interference sacred, as enshrined in TAC. As the 
Association becomes more firmly sheathed within its norms, it faces a 
tougher time to create institutional structures that are essential in in-
creasing intra-trade and deepening economic integration. The ASEAN 
way helped to achieve political stability in the region and so provided 
a conducive environment for foreign investment but it failed to enable 
member-states to capitalize on such opportunities collectively. 
Second, the generally authoritarian nature of Southeast Asian govern-
ments kept the region 'divided' and limited economic integration. From 
a realist perspective, the dominant goal of authoritarian leaders is to 
remain in power, thus the survival of the individual leader surpasses the 
interest of the state.5 Closer economic integration or the establishment 
of a treaty would lead to a trans-national organization and the subse-
quent loss of power in directing their respective national economies. 
Thus ASEAN norms (sovereignty, non-interference and consensual 
decision-making process) augment authoritarianism and preserve the 
divisions of nation-state identities. Those norms also provide an escape 
route if member states fail to agree on a common policy. As countries 
pursue their own economic agendas, they face difficulties in collective 
coordination of their economies, eventually leading to competition 
rather than complementarity. The formation of AFTA and the signing 
of various economic agreements reflected the awareness of external 
market forces like globalization rather than strong internal needs for 
market integration. Implementations of those agreements continue to 
remain a problem.6
The second reason was that ASEAN does not have an undisputed 
leader or a coalition of leaders to guide the organization. Indonesia, 
with the largest population and one of the strongest military, is often 
looked upon as the organization's leader. Indeed, the stationing of the 
Association's secretariat in Jakarta shows the recognition of Indonesia's 
importance in the region. Even the concept of musjawarah and mufakat 
originated from the traditional Indonesian village system, which became 
the standard norms of conduct for ASEAN. The fall of Suharto and the 
political and economical uncertainties that befell Indonesia thereafter 
are partly blamed for the disruption of ASEAN's goal in achieving 
an integrated community. Indonesia was important to ASEAN at the 
time of inception because of her size and military strength. By getting 
Indonesia to commit to ASEAN, it was hoped that any future mischief 
could be deterred. 
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But within ASEAN, Indonesia could hardly assert its leadership 
role as others were sceptical of her intentions or downplayed her 
position. Referring back to history, it's possible to provide a few ex-
amples. When Suharto first tried to lead the other founding members 
towards nonalignment as a response to foreign power rivalries, none 
followed. Malaysia and Thailand were subdued but the Philippines 
had no intention of giving up their strong bilateral defence ties with 
the US and the Singaporeans wanted to continue relying on British 
protection. Obviously, they saw external actors as vital in preventing 
Indonesia from dominating the region (Leifer 1989: 5-6). Another case 
of interest was the Vietnam-Cambodia issue – the invasion and occupa-
tion of Cambodia by Vietnam from 1978-90. Geographical proximity 
and external power interference were threatening ASEAN's security 
and thus saw the need to pull their strengths together. On the surface, 
it showed unity and managed to gain recognition from the interna-
tional community. However, things were murkier below the surface. 
Indonesia, which received the backing of ASEAN as interlocutor in 
that issue, was later undermined by Thailand's own independent ap-
proach in solving the matter.7 Such tacit manoeuvring clearly showed 
the limitation of Indonesia's reputation within the organization. A 
third example is best displayed by the proposal of EAEG by Malaysia. 
The unilateral approach taken not only irked the Indonesian camp 
but also put Indonesia's headship into question. Furthermore, while 
Indonesia may be strong militarily, it is relatively weak in economic 
terms, even more so now as it grapples with democratic transition. 
This has greatly prevented it from becoming the 'regional paymaster' 
in easing any distributional problems unlike what Germany was ca-
pable of doing for the EU. 
The limitation of Indonesia or any other members to hold the role of 
undisputed leader is manifested in the ASEAN process. The norms of 
procedure deny Indonesia any outright leadership role.8 Under musja-
warah, a leader is not allowed to act capriciously or forcefully and any 
suggestions given should take into consideration the views and feelings 
of fellow members. Mufakat will be achieved when all members agreed 
to those suggestions. The outcome is not only slow but reflecting the 
lowest common denominator. In this sense, the alleged hard and soft 
variables that determines an undisputed leadership role as submitted 
by Webber is less applicable in the case of ASEAN due to the presence 
of those unique norms of diplomacy that sets the organization apart 
from other regional entities. 
79
ASEAN's Regional Integration Challenge 
As for the third reason based on Mattli's 'commitment institutions', 
it is obvious that ASEAN lacks third-party enforcement machineries 
and this becomes very clear when compared to the EU. However, this 
reasoning irrespective of whether it is a pre-condition or a consequence 
of successful integration as Webber would argue has to be understood 
from the political culture that ASEAN operates in. Member-states have 
been frequently accused of not being willing to shift any decision-mak-
ing authority to higher supranational bodies. Any bilateral disputes that 
arise between members are mostly handled through quiet diplomacy 
where the organization is not involved. Disputes that cannot be settled 
are often put off to a later period. A case in point is the Philippines's 
claim over Sabah in the 1960s. It was suppressed after Marcos came 
into power and gave verbal assurance, but since no official treaty was 
signed, future dispute still remains highly possible. If trouble becomes 
unbearable, it is then referred to an outer international body and not 
ASEAN itself. This is true of the case between Malaysia and Indonesia 
over the jurisdiction of Sipadan and Ligitan islands. The same holds for 
the recent dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over the strategic 
island of Batu Puteh (or Pedra Branca). 
The inability to draft its own effective 'commitment institutions' and the 
reluctant reliance on international dispute settlement mechanisms could 
be seen as due to the practice of the ASEAN way that greatly puts con-
straint on the viability and implementation of such institutions. It clearly 
brings into question the norms of sovereignty and non-interference that 
are at the very centrepiece of ASEAN's foreign policy. This is the under-
lying factor to Mattli's definition of 'commitment institutions'. Without 
prior resolve of those norms, commitment and compliance would not be 
possible since it would undermine the powers of the individual leaders 
and the sovereignty statuses of member countries, all of which with the 
exception of Thailand experienced the harsh realities of colonialism and 
thus prize those values more highly than their Western counterparts. 
If the goal is only to reduce tensions and war in the region, then the 
ASEAN process can be likened to a unique kind of commitment 'insti-
tution', at least not within Mattli's classification, that has created 'stable 
expectations' and acts as a monitoring mechanism of mutually accept-
able behaviour in setting the course for any cooperative undertaking. 
However, ASEAN's goals go beyond that narrow definition and norms 
alone obviously remain inferior to legal rules. As Nischalke (2000: 89-112) 
points out in his research, there were instances when those fundamental 
principles have been breached.
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In 1999, there were calls for more concrete measures to be taken in 
solving problems that had beset the organization. Saying that the ASEAN 
way can no longer be maintained, former Indonesian foreign affairs advi-
sor Dewi Fortuna Anwar called for a crisis-management centre similar 
to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to 
be set up (International Herald Tribune, 22 April 1999). What transpired 
was the creation of the ASEAN Troika (2000) and the ASEAN High 
Council (2001). Some may tend to argue that they do represent a form 
of 'commitment institutions' with the purpose of providing a channel 
to manage and resolve disputes among members. Briefly, the ASEAN 
Troika is meant to deal with sudden flare up of disputes while the High 
Council is intended to deal with long-term disputes. They are claimed 
to be seen as a small step away from the traditional diplomatic culture 
of ASEAN. Indeed, it does reflect a shift from the traditional norm of 
non-involvement of the Association in any bilateral disputes. 
However, their effectiveness is put into question. Several reasons 
could be identified. First, the ASEAN Troika has failed to materialize 
as a permanent institution at the ministerial level. Instead it ended up 
as an ad hoc body. Thailand's Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai's proposal 
to institutionalize the Troika concept was seen by others as a 'clever 
effort to revitalize Surin Pitsuwan's proposal of flexible engagement 
in different garb' (Haacke 2003: 72). Second, it is not allowed to make 
any decisions on its own but only to offer recommendations in assist-
ing the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. Third, the Troika is subjected to the 
guidelines of the norms of procedure, specifically non-interference and 
consensus. All these point to the fact that the ASEAN way has not been 
diminished but rather enhanced. 
Not only it is important to prevent intervention from outside powers 
but also individual leaders are still reluctant to involve other regional 
members in their respective domestic affairs. Comparably, ASEAN's 
Troika is unmatched to the OSCE even though principles of sovereign 
equality, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes, territorial 
integrity, etc are also enshrined in the OSCE. On the rules of the proce-
dure of the ASEAN High Council, Haacke clearly noted that 'some of 
the rules of procedure reinforce rather than undermine existing norms of 
the ASEAN way' (Haacke 2003: 79). In contrast to the OSCE that allows 
any member nation to call for a dispute to be brought up before a com-
mission, the High Council could be invoked only by the state involved 
in the dispute, hence very much inline to the norms of non-interference 
and sovereignty. Whether they are just political gestures or have the 
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might to solve ASEAN's woes are yet unknown. But even as the ASEAN-
six may try to reinvent the organization in a more structured fashion, 
the ASEAN-four (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar – CVLM 
countries) will continue to resist and clam tight the diplomatic culture 
that they have come to identify with.
On Webber's third point, he argued that ASEAN is incapable of 
achieving closer or successful integration primarily because there are 
high disparities in the economic level of member-states that would ob-
struct any efforts toward collective actions. In other words, the political 
and economic climate in Southeast Asia is too heterogeneous to achieve 
a 'sense of community' or a common identity, which he believes to be 
the prerequisite for a successful regional organization. Here, the EU is 
once again evoked as a comparison. But while disparities may obstruct 
the integration process, it is not necessarily a strong argument. 
Claiming a degree of homogeneity among state actors in a region as 
a variable for comparison does, to some extent, deny the fact that until 
today there has not been any regional organization visible in Northeast 
Asia where the countries of China, Japan and Korea share more simi-
larities in many respects than the countries in Southeast Asia. Japan 
and Korea exhibit a wide range of economic and cultural resemblance. 
Economic cooperation through trade between the two countries has 
generated extensive business networks. Japanese trade and investment, 
not to mention developmental assistance, with China and China's shift 
to a market economy should have brought about some form of organi-
zational structure for cooperation in the region. Or, even the fact that the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) established in 1981 among countries 
with similar cultural traits has remained weak and insignificant for two 
decades. Discrepancies in political and economic systems or lingering 
historical animosities are as or could even be more essential hurdles 
to regional integration in comparison to religious or cultural qualities. 
The ability of ASEAN to bring the three Northeast Asian countries into 
economic cooperation through the ASEAN+3 Process stand to further 
weaken Webber's point above. 
A more fundamental factor in the obstruction of collective action 
and crisis management in ASEAN should be directed at the norms of 
procedure that have developed over a long period of time. The seeing 
of themselves as feeble states and hence the need to uphold power and 
maintain sovereign rights not as a region but as individual states has 
exacerbated foreign policy divergence and, coupled with the overarching 
of protectionism especially among newer members, do not bode well 
82  The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 20•2004
Benny Teh Cheng Guan
in breaking down the walls of political divisions. The ASEAN way has 
been 'highly successful at altering the interactions' of members but it is 
neither capable nor designed to 'alter their definitions of their national 
interests' (Narine 1997: 965). This limitation is a key factor in hindering 
the cooperative process towards shared common political values and 
goals of the organization. 
The fourth and final reason was about how the United States perceives 
regional integration plans in regions that fall under its sphere of influ-
ence. Here, Webber argues that without the Johnson Administration's 
approval and the critical role it played, ASEAN would not have come 
to life. ASEAN received US support due to its anti-communist raison 
d'être, which was 'entirely congruent' with the US's objectives of that 
time, while its current attitude towards the Association is one of 'benign 
indifference' (Webber 2001: 351-53). The view that ASEAN succeeded 
in its creation because of US approval is rather misleading. ASEAN's 
initial focus on communism may have run parallel to President Johnson's 
Asian policy but its formation was much less of a US influence. 
As Yamakage clearly points out that ASEAN was never a part of any 
US anti-communist strategy. Indonesia, which proposed the name of 
ASEAN and wished to incorporate the principle of nonalignment into 
the organization, was never aware of any attempts to use ASEAN as an 
anti-communist satellite. Policies taken by ASEAN governments were 
actually disassociated from US policy. He notes that on the contrary, 
fear of US withdrawal from the region and over dependence on the 
US were factors that led Southeast Asian countries to form ASEAN 
(Yamakage 1997).9 
Nonetheless, the US factor can be best understood when the failed 
EAEG is taken as an example. The reason for the failure of the EAEG plan 
was principally the mistaken exclusion of US from the equation. Other 
factors notwithstanding, had the EAEG been defined along the lines of 
open regionalism and assured US interests, an East Asian organization 
could have emerged. But, as Webber admits, it is a factor concerning 
the success or failure of attempts at regional integration for states that 
are susceptible to American pressure. US presence may help accelerate 
the integration process by providing security and maintaining stability 
in a region or decelerate it by influencing the policies of regional states. 
European integration plans in the early period were strongly supported 
by the US, which provided the security role of containing Germany, thus 
giving France adequate confidence to construct a bilateral relationship 
with Germany. 
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US presence in Southeast Asia has also played an integral part in 
stabilizing the region. However, it does not qualify as a pre-condition 
for successful regional integration. The US factor failed to be sustainable 
as is clearly proved when ASEAN asserted its independence and voted 
to admit Myanmar in 1997 in plain defiance against the US stance. Al-
though admitting Myanmar remains a controversial issue, ASEAN went 
a step closer to achieving its long-term goal of uniting all of Southeast 
Asia.10 Therefore, even if the US shows 'benign indifference' to ASEAN, 
there should be no grounds for the organization to derail from its course. 
What is obstructing ASEAN's path to closer integration is not the US but 
rather the lack of a shared vision and political unity among the members. 
The ASEAN process that defines how ASEAN operates clearly limits the 
organization's ability to move towards stronger and deeper integration. 
It is more of an internal condition than an external factor.
Reformulating the ASEAN Way
The above analysis mostly showed an existence of a common denomina-
tor – the ASEAN way. The reasons promulgated by Mattli and Webber 
of ASEAN as a 'failed' regional integration scheme is actually tied to 
a deeper root cause that specifically points to the nature of the organi-
zation's diplomatic culture. While recognizing the ASEAN process as 
embedded in the system, the paper calls for necessary reconfiguration 
and supplementation in line with the changing regional and interna-
tional landscape. 
There has been some reluctant progress to date. In 1998, an attempt 
was made in the effort to readjust the ASEAN way through a policy 
proposal of 'flexible engagement'. It was a realization by some quarters 
that there is a need to shift towards a more transparent and open discus-
sion. This realization came after the Association was highly criticized 
and blamed for its failure to unite and manage the Asian financial crisis 
collectively. However, there was resistance against the proposal. Then 
Malaysian Foreign Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, made his stance 
clear when he wrote 'I believe in consultation, definitely not intervention 
– flexible or otherwise' (Asiaweek, 25 December 1998). The proposal was 
finally rejected largely because the concept itself was poorly spelled out 
and there were fear among members that it would undermine regime 
security (Haacke 1999: 592-98). Instead, member countries settled for a 
less impressive formula of 'enhanced interaction'.
The new adopted terminology allows member states to convene and 
discuss problems when a domestic concern of one country produces 
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vibrating effects on other countries and when transnational problems 
like drug trafficking, smuggling, and piracy require cooperative efforts. 
In practice, it has not wavered much from the general agreed code of 
conduct, as even Thailand, which came up with the proposal, has kept 
much of its interaction rather compatible with ASEAN's traditional 
diplomacy. Agreements like the Transboundary Haze Pollution, the 
ASEAN Troika and the High Council, signed after 1998, are meant to 
provide a more institutionalized approach to problem solving. It may 
show a general move towards loosening the grip primarily on the norm 
of non-interference. But these agreements do demonstrate a flaw. As 
explained in the previous section, only the country involved in a dis-
pute or a problem can raise the issue for discussion. The question then 
becomes what happens when a member country decides not to do so 
with a domestic problem that has turned into a regional one. Power 
continues to be vested at the national level and since there are no means 
of forcing compliance, there will be obstacles in implementing those 
agreements. Quiet diplomacy still reigns, more so in the post-Asian 
crisis as the Southeast Asian countries busily continue to engage in 
nation-building.
While the ASEAN way has brought relative peace to the region, it 
clearly demonstrates insufficiency in providing a strong platform for 
regional integration. The paradox is that a total abandonment would risk 
threatening ASEAN's own survival but full preservation will only cause 
the organization to lose out (Kuroyanagi 2003: 170-71). Since there is a 
strong desire to go beyond the current level of cooperation as further in-
dicated in the 2003 Bali Concord II Declaration for Economic, Security and 
Socio-cultural communities, the ASEAN way ought to be rethought. The 
supplementation of 'commitment institutions' and the reconfiguration of 
at least three key norms – sovereignty, non-interference and consensus 
– are indispensable in achieving the objectives of ASEAN. 
'Commitment Institutions'
It is difficult to envision a strong integrated ASEAN without having ef-
fective forms of commitment institutions in place. Democratization and 
further economic integration may encourage member countries to see 
beyond their narrow individual interests and open the door for mutual 
acceptance of higher institutional structures. 'Commitment institutions' 
would serve as pivotal pillars that would help to constrain the mem-
bers from reneging on the rules of cooperation. This would lead to the 
enhancement of transparency in the workings of ASEAN and reduce 
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the need for quiet diplomacy. It will also ensure that the countries stay 
committed to the many initiatives and projects like AFTA, AIA and 
other new ones being introduced. 
ASEAN has been introducing various initiatives to keep up with 
global developments. As those initiatives become more sophisticated, 
institutionalization beyond the state would be inevitable or else there 
will be further disparities and unevenness if left to the devices of in-
dividual states. Without doubt, ASEAN has to reinvent itself. At the 
current stage, the ASEAN process would make any proposition of 
'commitment institutions' improbable. As yet, there is still a lack of 
preparedness to pool sovereignty in a way that is beneficial for the 
entire region and its wider population. A 'super structure of politics' 
may be what the organization needs to integrate the differing political 
cultures of member states (Pitsuwan 2001: 10). The more the Association 
is able to change its current diverse governance structure into a more 
homogenized form through the cultivation of a common set of political 
values, the better it will succeed in its integration plans. Thus, ASEAN 
has to assign itself the task of converting its members into a standard-
ized political set-up. 
To date, the Association has identified the need to strengthen its 
Secretariat by enhancing its role and sharpening its priorities. How-
ever, this should also duly include the transfer of more authority for 
it to function as a respected central and legal body governing the ten 
member countries. While political divisions continue to be a dilemma 
for ASEAN, it has come up with some ambitious plans on the economic 
front. Under the Roadmap for Integration of ASEAN (RIA), there are 
three main pillars: firstly, to narrow the economic development gap of 
the organization's older and newer members through a six-year Initiative 
for ASEAN Integration (IAI) work plan (July 2002-June 2008); secondly, 
to deepen economic cooperation in areas like energy (ASEAN Power 
Grid), transport (ASEAN Highway Network) and sub-regional growth 
areas; and thirdly, to improve economic cooperation through market 
integration initiatives such as AFTA and ASEAN Investment Area. These 
projects require proper management and extensive coordination as well 
as effective dispute mechanisms to ensure their success. With the sup-
plementation of 'commitment institutions', not only will the projects be 
better managed but it will also certainly raise ASEAN's competitiveness 
amid other regional groupings and avoid being marginalized. The re-
alization of such institutions will, however, depend on two key norms 
– sovereignty and non-interference. 
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Sovereignty and Non-interference
The cardinal principle, sovereignty, and its corollary principle, non-in-
terference or non-intervention, are perceived as the most problematic 
concepts which obstruct successful integration. While both principles 
date back as far as the Westphalia agreement of 1648 and have been 
serving as the basic rule of interstate relationship in the world, ASEAN 
took to them as its sacred tenet. These principles allowed ASEAN to 
be formed as a regional organization in a region beset with mutual 
suspicion, distrust and political rivalry. Intermittent intervention in 
internal affairs notwithstanding, only through these principles could 
ASEAN assure regime security for its members, that in return assures 
the Association's survival. 
Sovereignty-bound, ASEAN took the role of controlling conflict be-
tween member parties. Together with other norms that came to define 
the ASEAN way, community building was gradually made possible. 
While ASEAN was not a fully-fledged security community, it demon-
strated some of the characteristics of no armed interstate conflict and 
military build-up (see Acharya 1995: 175-200; Narine 2002: 71-74). The 
beginning of the 1990s saw a different kind of challenge, an economic 
one that would seriously flout the principle of sovereignty. The cur-
rent waves of fluid movements in the global arena with the advent of 
globalization, domestic issues increasingly manifest themselves into 
diplomatic problems and the emerging civil societies of Southeast Asia 
are all taking great toll of the traditional principles of absolute sover-
eignty and non-interference. 
The principle of non-interference in domestic affairs is a significant 
barrier that impedes the capability to achieve far greater integration. Can 
there be a high level of integration by strictly adhering to this principle? 
The 1997 crisis has proved how disastrous it can be for the region. It 
has shown that as the countries in the region become more and more 
interdependent, the old argument of non-interference become less and 
less attractive. Sooner or later it has to be discarded, for every Southeast 
Asian country should be its brother's keeper. The adoption of enhanced 
interaction, while minimal, is a good start. At least it shows leaders' will-
ingness to engage in discussion. But obviously it is inadequate. If ASEAN 
wants to solve its own problems and avoid being divided into the haves 
and have-nots, the members will have to engage each other in a more 
mature and constructive environment. This is where the ASEAN-six can 
teach by example. The alternative would be to wait for all the member 
states to become fully democratic (Yamakage 2001: 139-40).11 But even 
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then, being democratic alone does not suffice. It has to be coupled with 
economic prosperity to create confidence. Unfortunately, what the As-
sociation does not have is time. 
Most member countries are fearful of having a strong functional 
ASEAN for fear of incurring a diminished national policymaking au-
tonomy. However, the issue is not entirely about ceding some colossal 
principle of sovereignty. It is more specifically about engaging in 'sov-
ereignty bargains' – the acceptance of certain limitation in exchange for 
other benefits (Litfin 1997). With sovereignty comprising three elements 
of autonomy (or independence in policymaking and action), control 
(the ability to produce an effect), and legitimacy (the recognized right 
to make rules), a state may bargain for more control over autonomy or 
have its legitimacy undercut by increased control (Mattli 2000: 150). In 
this sense, sovereignty is being reconfigured through voluntary agree-
ments but not necessarily diminished. If autonomy was traded for more 
economic security in ASEAN, the damage caused by the Asian crisis 
could have been limited as the 1997 experience clearly showed how 
interdependent the region is and the vulnerability of individual state 
policies in containing the spread. 
In ASEAN, there are still other challenges that need to be taken into 
consideration. Apart from differing political systems (from democracy 
to military regime) and a general lack of trust, the Association's ex-
pansionist policies have made sovereignty reconfiguration harder. In 
comparing the accession of prospective candidates in EU and ASEAN, 
there is a clear distinction between the two. The newer members of 
ASEAN (CVLM) acceded without much sovereignty bargains that other 
EU prospective members had to go through. Unlike the EU, ASEAN's 
only political criterion for its potential members was for them to agree 
to accept the ASEAN way and in the case of Myanmar, the acceptance 
of constructive engagement. What attracted them was not national 
prosperity in exchange for autonomy (as in the case of EU) but political 
enhancement and external legitimacy in exchange for none. The ASEAN 
way became a lucrative guarantor of their newly hard-won sovereign 
rights. They will reject any changes in the sovereignty configuration. It 
is therefore critical to enmesh the newer member economies with the 
old in deepening intra-trade to increase interdependency that would 
lead to the demand for sovereignty bargains and the natural fallout of 
strict non-intervention terms. 
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Consensus Decision-making
An important norm in ASEAN, consensus or mufakat is both the or-
ganization's strong as well as its weak point. The consensus norm puts 
each member on an equal footing, allowing the smaller and weaker 
states to have their voices heard (in the absence of legalistic rules) and 
its non-binding nature gives members the choice to forego initiatives or 
policies that run contrary to their national interests. Consensus taken 
provides an impression of unity among fellow members in the eyes of 
the international community. Furthermore, it confines public disputes 
and shelters any member from losing face in an international locale. 
On the other hand, consensus reached is normally on the lowest and at 
times the slowest common denominator. It is unable to produce results 
on contentious and detrimental matters (the economic meltdown being a 
case). Since the responsibility for a decision is spread among the group, 
no one member can be found accountable for the consequences of the 
decision. It drags the organization from evolving rapidly. No doubt, this 
will become even more acute with enlargement as it increases ASEAN's 
political and economic diversity and complicates the decision making 
process (see International Herald Tribune, 22 April 1999; Asiaweek, 25 
December 1998). Some problems occurring from expansion are as fol-
lows. First, the CVLM countries' commitment to the Association remains 
fairly weak. Even after seven years in ASEAN, Myanmar has continued 
to defy popular pressure with its antics and caused the organization 
great embarrassment. With their recent membership, it would take more 
than just a few years to create a sense of belonging. Second, many of 
them lack the resources and funds to carry out ASEAN's activities and 
implement agreements reached at the regional level. Developmental 
assistance from older members would certainly help ease the transition 
but the economic difficulties endured after 1997 is putting a burden on 
all parties. Countries like Indonesia are still trying hard to kick start 
their battered economies. It wouldn't be surprising if the realization of 
the Vision 2020 is pushed further back. Third, the number of political 
ideologies or state systems has increased accordingly. Different variants 
of communism, socialism and military regime are introduced. This has 
not been an immediate problem because non-intervention continues to 
be observed. But lately, signs of discontent are manifesting themselves 
against Myanmar's recent activities and they could well become the 
centre of contention as the organization intensifies its move towards 
integration. There will be a need for more homogeneous political gov-
ernance between the ten member countries. It is in this respect that the 
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ASEAN-four would have to evolve at a much faster rate both politically 
and economically to close ranks with the ASEAN-six countries. 
Being aware of the expansion problem and the difficulty in getting 
consensus, the Association has resorted to adopting the 'Ten minus X' 
principle. In getting around the consensus problem, this principle allows 
those who are ready to move forward with liberalization do so without 
being held back by the slower ones. The most obvious example is the 
acceptance of a two-tier AFTA. The original six ASEAN members would 
surge ahead with plans while the CVLM members are given more time 
to catch up with reform measures. Free from constraints, the ASEAN-
six can better position themselves to compete directly with the Chinese 
economy. However, the fear is that it may widen instead of closing the 
gap and cause more tension between mainland and maritime Southeast 
Asia.12 The new trend of bilateral free trade arrangements led by Singa-
pore could increase wealth disparities and create resentment and envy in 
those who may not have the means or be in the position to do the same. 
At present however, the ASEAN-four is moving to close the gap. In 1999, 
the combined gross national income per capita in terms of purchasing 
power parity for the older members was 9.17 times more than the newer 
members while it went down to 7.87 times in 2002 (The World Bank).13 
This development should be further encouraged by having institutional 
measures in place to guarantee redistribution of income in the direction 
of the poorer members to maintain the integration of ASEAN. 
Consensus, as traditionally understood, is no longer capable of de-
fending the ideals of the organization in a global environment that is 
increasingly intrusive and competitive. Internally, it is causing some 
members to get restless and impatient. With the 'Ten minus X' formula, 
consensus has been redefined and as such does not connote unanimity. 
One is not obliged to wait for another. But while it is not unanimity (the 
outcome may not reflect everyone's preference), consensus decision-
making still calls for general agreement and the resolving of objections 
as part of the process that will, above all, take time. As ASEAN matures, 
it should display more flexibility in its decision–making process by 
introducing majority voting for issues that cannot afford the luxury of 
time. A fair voting process can prevent coercion and manipulation that 
are at times associated with consensus. The majority vote is also a good 
method to arrive at decisions on issues and not to defer or put on hold 
in a way which will subsequently create a large backlog of undecided 
matters. Clearly, the rapid economic development of China and India 
is threatening the Association's traditional approach of taking matters 
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slowly and step by step. There is hardly any room for mistrust and 
suspicion. Consensus decision making will have to be further rethought 
and reconfigured to best support the complexities of institutionalism 
that is increasingly seen as inevitable in a growing ASEAN. 
The call to speed up integration by Singapore and Thailand during 
last year's Bali Summit is an obvious indication of restlessness within 
the organization. Their readiness to work with each other should not 
be bogged down by having to wait for time consuming consensus in 
deciding on the 'Two minus X' approach (any two countries can work 
together first on specific sectors while the others can join in later). Al-
lowing Singapore and Thailand to surge ahead with their plans for 
cooperation can later place them in a good position to assist in the 
development of other slower member economies. It could well be an 
answer to the quest for a benevolent leader or a coalition of leaders 
which has been noted as an important condition for successful integra-
tion. In exchange, there must be commitment to assume some sort of 
a paymaster role in easing distributional tensions and other foreseeable 
conflicts within the group. This will entail sovereignty bargains and 
the shouldering of more responsibilities in the effort to create a well 
integrated and successful ASEAN. 
Conclusion
In reviewing the analysis of the determinants of the success and failure 
of regional integration, this study has managed to identify a deeper 
root cause of the reasons that are obstructing ASEAN from realizing 
its stated integration goals. The problem generally lies in the Associa-
tion's diplomatic culture – the working tradition that has come to be 
understood as the ASEAN way or the ASEAN process. It is a guiding 
principle that has over the years built confidence and trust among the 
members in the region. It has generated a certain level of comfort and 
understanding between the member states. 
However, the ASEAN way in its current configuration is not compe-
tent to steer the region towards an integrated community. The fact that 
ASEAN is built on norms and shaky institutional structures will not help 
it to weather the storm of globalization and new regional challenges 
posed by two neighbouring giants, China and India. Furthermore, a 
second Asian crisis must be avoided at all cost. It is in the light of these 
factors, among others, that the paper calls for the Association to make an 
urgent priority of strengthening itself internally. The ASEAN diplomacy 
must be reviewed, reconfigured and supplemented if there are going to 
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be genuine efforts at integration. The reconfiguration of the norms of 
sovereignty, non-intervention and consensus and the supplementation 
of 'commitment institutions' will strengthen ASEAN's core foundation 
and speed up the process as the organization no longer has the benefit 
of time. Elimination of those norms do not pose a viable option and by 
this recognition, the paper breaks away from traditional literatures and 
introduces concepts of sovereignty bargaining and majority voting that 
the Association should explore to help it overcome some of the limita-
tions of its diplomatic culture. Furthermore, it is equally important to 
recognize that the three norms are interlinked and the reconfiguration 
of one may affect the other. A move to adopt constructive interference, 
for example, may require a shift in the consensus decision making 
process and such adoption may not be possible without some form of 
sovereignty bargain between the members. Likewise, the introduction 
of 'commitment institutions' will require the alteration of the stringent 
principles of non-intervention and sovereignty. 
From the review of the conditions for successful integration, the paper 
finds that the reasons promulgated by Mattli and Webber are insufficient 
in explaining why ASEAN has not been successful in its integration quest. 
The measurement for 'successfulness' based on the understanding of 
western integration models or on pure economic factors or even certain 
external variables risk over-generalizing and overlooking the internal 
complexities of an organization such as ASEAN which has been in exist-
ence for more than 30 years and would therefore suggest the presence of 
a political culture that plays a fundamental role in shaping and dictating 
the interaction of member countries. The ASEAN way is an important 
criterion that must be factored in to avoid too simplistic explanations 
that are incapable of fully capturing the intricacies of the region. 
The Association's enlargement exercise has proved to be an expensive 
adventure. It must carefully consider the consequences if there is to 
be an accession of East Timor. The focus now should be fully geared 
towards the internal strengthening of the organization and the further 
involvement of a wider circle of non-elites and the general population 
in the effort to build a competitive institution, one that can be identified 
and be proud of by the people of ASEAN. 
Benny Teh Cheng Guan is a Ph.D. Candidate at The Graduate School of Socio-
Environmental Studies, Kanazawa University.
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1    The framework is derived from Walter Mattli (1999) and Douglas Webber (2001). 
2    For more details, see Busse (1999) and Snitwongse (1995: 520). 
3    Acharya (2001: 47-68) discerns between ASEAN norms like non-interference, peace-
ful resolution, non-use of force, and regional autonomy and the ASEAN way such 
as informality, consensus-building and consultation. 
4    During the 23rd ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1991, five 
proposals were put on the table. There were the Malaysian EAEG, the Thai AFTA, the 
Indonesian CEPT, the Philippine ASEAN Treaty of Economic Cooperation and the 
Singaporean sub-regional growth triangles. Dr Mahathir Mohamad pushed strongly 
for the EAEG, casting doubt on the 'ability of ASEAN to create an operational free 
trade area'. The final consensus led to the birth of AFTA and CEPT, achieved during 
the Singapore ASEAN Summit in January 1992 (Palmujoki 2001: 54-55). 
5    This is based on Steven David's theory of omnibalancing, which argues that the 
main actors of Third World countries in international politics are individual rulers 
and not the state (David 1991). 
6    As Funston (2000: 4) pointed out that the practice of non-intervention has caused 
'plans for economic cooperation [to gather] dust as countries adhered to protectionist 
policies and refused to make concessions to neighbours'. 
7    Under Thailands's new Premier, Chatichai Choonhavan, a series of initiatives were 
taken towards the Indochina states. First, a change in economic policy gradually 
increased export items to Laos and the normalization process let to Chatichai's visit 
in 1988. Second, Chatichai departed from the established Thai policy to recognize 
the Phnom Penh government by welcoming Prime Minister Hun Sen to an infor-
mal meeting in 1989. Third, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila formally visited 
Vietnam in 1989 under Chatichai's persuasion. The visit not only signalled support 
from the Thai Foreign Ministry for the prime minister's diplomacy but also brought 
home successful trade negotiations and the acknowledgement for neutralization of 
Cambodia (Sudô 1996: 64-68).
8    Indonesia, at best, was accepted as 'first among equals' (Lee 2000: 370).
9    It is also worth noting here that ASEAN cannot be formed on the grounds of anti-com-
munism for history has shown that Indonesia rejected the Association of Southeast 
Asia (ASA) because of its perceived political connections to the Southeast Asian 
Treaty Organization (SEATO).
10    For an interesting account on the accession of Myanmar into ASEAN, see Palmujoki 
(2001: 47-49).
11    Yamakage notes that the norm of non-interference as a barrier can be removed in 
long term when democracy matures in each member state. 
12    For some viewpoints on this issue, see Asia Times Online 20 February 2003.
13    Statistical data was unavailable for Brunei and Myanmar.
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